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COMMENTS 
GRIFFIN v. CALIFORNIA: 
STILL VIABLE AFTER ALL THESE YEARS 
Craig M. Bradley* 
In Gr!ffin v. Cal!fornia 1 the Supreme Court held that a provision 
of the California Constitution allowing adverse comment by the 
judge and the prosecutor on a criminal defendant's failure to testify 
violated the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution.2 
The essence of the Court's brief opinion was expressed in a few lines: 
[C]omment on the refusal to testify is a remnant of the "inquisitorial 
system of criminal justice" . . . which the Fifth Amendment outlaws. 
It is a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional privi-
lege. It cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly.3 
Griffin was a response to prosecutorial argument of the sort made in 
Linebarger v. Ok/ahoma.4 In that burglary case where the defen-
dant, who had a prior burglary conviction, did not testify, witnesses 
reported that the prosecutor's (unrecorded) argument involved 
pointing his finger at the defendant and exclaiming, "Larry Gail 
Linebarger, why don't you take the stand in your own defense? Be-
cause you know you are guilty."5 
In a recent article in the Michigan Law Review, Donald Ayer 
levels a series of attacks on the Griffin decision.6 Specifically, he 
maintains that the decision is at once too broad, because it requires 
"almost automatic reversal where there are any remarks explicitly 
focused on the defendant's silence and the inference of guilt to be 
* Associate Professor, Indiana University School of Law (Bloomington). A.B. 1967, Uni-
versity of North Carolina; J.D. 1970, University of Virginia. Former Assistant United States 
Attorney, Washington, D.C. - Ed. 
The author wishes to express his appreciation to Professors Stanley Fickle and Alex 
Tanford for their extremely helpful advice in the preparation of this Comment. 
I. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
2. 380 U.S. at 613. 
3. 380 U.S. at 614 (footnotes omitted). 
4. 404 F.2d 1092 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 938 (1969). 
5. 404 F.2d at 1094. The court in Linebarger conceded that such an argument was barred 
by Gr!!fin but, because of conflicting reports of witnesses, could not be sure whether the argu-
ment had actually occurred as the witnesses had reported. 
6. Ayer, The Fffeh Amendment and the Inference of Guilt from Silence: Gr!IJin v. Cal!/ornla 
Afler Fffeeen Years, 18 MICH. L. REv. 841 (1980). 
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drawn from it"7 regardless of the strength of the prosecution's case, 
and too narrow, because it fails to prevent the natural prejudice 
against the nontestifying defendant that may arise in the minds of 
the jurors without any encouragement from prosecutor or judge. 8 
Ayer also contends that prosecutors should be permitted to argue 
that a defendant's failure to testify is evidence that he is guilty be-
cause such an argument is "rational" and advances the search for 
truth.9 Finally, he urges that the Griffin rule finds no basis in the 
fifth amendment and its historic purposes.10 
This Comment challenges all three of Mr. Ayer's arguments. It 
takes the position that the limitations on prosecutorial conduct estab-
lished in Griffin remain an important and logically defensible protec-
tion of the defendant's fifth amendment right not to testify. 
Moreover, it argues that Ayer's attacks on the Griffin doctrine are 
based upon a fundamental misconception about the reasons criminal 
defendants choose not to testify at trial. 
Ayer's opening attack on Griffin is to maintain that the opinion is 
both too broad and too narrow. His broadness attack -·that the 
opinion mandates reversal for almost any violation of the "no com-
ment" rule-is curious in light of Griffin's successor case, Chapman 
v. Cal!fomia, 11 which was decided two years later. Chapman held 
that a violation of the Griffin rule did not require ''virtually auto-
matic" reversal, as Ayer charges, 12 but rather only shifted the burden 
to the government to prove ''beyond a reasonable doubt that the er-
ror complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."13 As 
Ayer recognizes in another part of his article, federal courts are 
"commonly'' able to conclude that improper prosecutorial comment 
in a particular case does not require reversal, usually because the 
prosecution's case was so strong that the offending comment was 
thought to have had no impact on the guilty verdict. 14 
7. Id. at 844. 
8. Id. at 845. 
9. Id. at 855. 
10. Id. at 848-52. 
11. 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
12. Ayer, supra note 6, at 844. 
13. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). 
14. See Ayer, supra note 6, at 846 & nn.22 & 23. Ayer concludes that these cases show that 
the lower federal courts have given Griffin a "grudging reception," and that this attitude by the 
lower courts "offers another, empirical ground for reevaluation." Id. at 846. 
To conclude that application of the Chapman doctrine to Griffin violations precisely as 
mandated by the Supreme Court indicates that the lower courts disapprove of Griffin is an 
exercise of judicial psychoanalysis that I cannot follow. A reading of the cases cited by Ayer 
discloses no criticism of the Griffin rule, either express or implied, but simply a common-sense 
application of Chapman, in which the Supreme Court itself limited Griffin. If popularity were 
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Ayer's "narrowness" attack also misses the mark. It is certainly 
true, as the Court recognized in Gr!lfin, that no ruling by the Court 
could stop a jury from inferring guilt from silence if it were so in-
clined.15 While this is accurate, it does not follow that the Court 
should abandon rules that increase fairness solely because they can-
not ensure an absolutely fair trial in every single case. Gr!lfin adds to 
the protections afforded the defendant. To abolish the no comment 
rule, as Ayer urges, would diminish those protections. 16 Conse-
quently, while Gr!lfin may be "narrow'' in that it fails to completely 
solve the problem of prejudice toward a nontestifying defendant, it is 
far less "narrow'' than Ayer's proposed solution.17 
Ayer's second argument makes a basic assumption which under-
the test of the validity of Supreme Court pronouncements, it is hard to imagine a decision that 
would have been more readily accepted than Gr!flin, since its "no comment" rule was already 
the law in 44 states and, by statute, in federal jurisdictions. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 
609, 611-12 nn. 3 & 4 (1965); 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1976). 
In any event, Ayer's "empirical" data, Ayer, supra note 6, at 846, is incorrect. See Annot., 
14 A.L.R.3d 730-46 (1967), for a discussion of the many state and federal cases, both before 
and after Gr!f!in, where convictions were reversed due to the violation of the "no comment" 
rule. See, e.g., United States v. Flannery, 451 F.2d 880 (1st Cir. 1971); United States v. 
Handman, 447 F.2d 853 (7th Cir. 1971). Many other courts have found harmless error in 
particular cases. See Ayer, supra note 6, at 846 n.23. 
15. It is said . . . that the inference of guilt for failure to testify . . . is in any event 
natural and irresistible, and that comment on the failure does not magnify that inference 
into a penalty for asserting a constitutional right. . . . What the jury may infer, given no 
help from the Court, is one thing. What it may infer when the Court solemnizes the 
silence of the accused into evidence against him is quite another. 
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965) (citation omitted). 
16. Ayer implies that he disagrees with the Court's conclusion in Gr!f!in that prosecutorial 
comment upon failure to testify is a "penalty," 380 U.S. at 614, by saying that "undue 
prejudice cannot be assumed." Ayer, supra note 6, at 846. While the question of what is "due" 
or ''undue" is where I take issue with Ayer, there should be no misunderstanding that such 
comment is harmful to the defendant. See Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 196-97 
(1943). The jury will undoubtedly speculate as to why the defendant fails to testify, but the 
damage is considerably greater when prosecutors like the one in Gr!f!in list all of the matters as 
to which the defendant had exclusive knowledge "but has not seen fit •.. to explain." 380 
U.S. at 611 (1965). 
17. Another general criticism that Ayer levels at the opinion is that it was the product ofan 
excess of zeal on the part of the Warren Court, decided "at the peak of its enthusiasm to 
expand the constitutional protection of criminal defendants." Ayer, supra note 6, at 841. Gr!f-
jin was, he says, ''the first Supreme Court decision to hold comment on a defendant's failure to 
testify offensive to the constitutional right of silence." Id. at 842 n. 7. This is technically true 
but misleading. A federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1976) (enacted in 1948) forbade 
prosecutorial comment on the defendant's failure to testify and for this reason, a constitutional 
holding was not required until the fifth amendment was applied to the states in Malloy v. 
Hagan, 378 U.S. I (1964), decided shortly before Gr!f!in. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 
609, 619-20 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court had specifically 
recognized that the purpose of the statute was ''to protect this [fifth amendment] right." Stew-
art v. United States, 366 U.S. I, 2 (1961). See also Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 
196-97 (1943) (quoting a holding of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania that "no inferences 
whatever can be legitimately drawn ... from the legal assertion by the [defendant] of his 
constitutional right" for to do so would be a "mockery of justice"). The Gr!flin Court was 
hardly writing on a clean slate in terms of recognizing the ''no comment" rule as part of the 
fifth amendment right to silence. 
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lies his entire article and with which I strongly disagree. He assumes 
that the inference of guilt from silence is "rational" because "a 
wrongfully accused person will want to speak up and present his 
story."18 Because of that assumed rationality, Ayer concludes that 
the burden imposed by prosecutorial comment on the defendant's 
silence is indistinguishable from other burdens upon the exercise of 
constitutional rights that the Court has permitted. It is the position 
of thi~ Comment that such a prosecutorial argument is impermissible 
because it asks the jury to draw an unjustifiable inference from the 
exercise of a constitutional right. 
It is true that it is a basic human impulse to deny a charge of 
criminal wrongdoing, but it is an impulse that is common to guilty 
and innocent defendants alike. The appropriate inference to be 
drawn from the failure to deny is simply this: a person, guilty or inno-
cent, w11! deny guilt unless he perceives that the denial will be more 
costly than silence. 
The arrested defendant's natural impulse when dealing with the 
police is to try to exculpate himself, regardless of whether he is in 
fact guilty or innocent. In Miranda v. Arizona 19 the Court, recogniz-
ing this tendency, held that the defendant must be warned of the 
rights to silence and counsel before being encouraged by police to 
give in to that impulse. Miranda was followed by Doyle v. Ohio ,20 
which held that an assertion of the right to silence by an arrestee 
could not be used against him at trial because such an assertion was 
"insolubly ambiguous."21 One simply could not know what had im-
pelled the arrestee to refuse to speak, and no inference of guilt could 
therefore be drawn from that refusal.22 
At trial the assertion of the right to silence is even more ambigu-
ous because it is inevitably a decision of counsel (or with counsel's 
advice) rather than of the accused alone. Counsel weighs the costs of 
18. Ayer, supra note 6, at 855. Ayer recognizes, as did the Court in Gr!ffen, that there are 
other possible explanations for silence besides guilt, such as excessive timidity or nervousness 
or the fear of impeachment with prior convictions. Id. at 855 n.57. However, he brushes these 
aside by observing that "(c)ommon sense would indicate that neither of these concerns would 
deter an innocent defendant from having his say in court, except in the most extraordinary of 
circumstances," Id. at 855-56 n.57, and that it is "contrary to human nature" for an innocent 
person who fears impeachment with prior convictions not to testify. Id. at 868 n.121. In any 
case, he argues that even if such factors do motivate defendants "a significant fraction of the 
time," the inference of guilt from silence is still rational because "the inferred fact (guilt) [is] 
'more likely than not to flow from' the established fact (silence). County Court of Ulster 
County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 165 (1979)." Id. at 856 n.57. 
19. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
20. 426 U.S. 610 (1976). 
21. 426 U.S. at 617. 
22. 426 U.S. at 617-18. 
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not testifying (the fear that the jury will hold it against the defend-
ant, the inability to tell his full story, etc.) against the costs of testify-
ing. The latter may include the defendant's unconvincing demeanor, 
confusion, or faulty memory as to details of his story, and especially, 
the fear that he will be impeached with prior convictions.23 
A leading trial manual has listed various reasons why defense 
counsel may decide whether or not to have his client testify. They 
include: 
(A) The desirability of having the defendant appear to "come clean. ,, 
(B) Whether the defendant has something to say that is legally and/actu-
ally supportive of the theory of the defense. . . . 
(C) Whether what he has to say can be shown by other witnesses. 
(D) Whether what he has to say, and the way he says it, are credible. 
Both the inherent plausibility of his story and his demeanor are impor-
tant .... 
(E) Whether the defendant is likeable or distasteful, sympathetic or ob-
noxious, etc. . . . Does he make a better impression with his mouth 
shut, or open? 
(F) Whether the defendant has a prior record. . . . 
(G)-(1) [Whether there is potentially damaging evidence or impeach-
ment matter to which defendant's testimony will open the door.] 
(J) Whether cross-examination of the defendant is likely to supply defi-
ciencies or bolster weaknesses in the prosecution's case in chief.24 
Nowhere among the factors to be considered is the question of 
whether the defendant is, or whether his attorney believes that he is, 
actually guilty. While that fact will influence such matters as the 
credibility of his story or the existence of impeachment evidence, the 
question of actual guilt is essentially irrelevant. Rather, appearances 
are what are important. It is easy to conceive of a guilty defendant 
who is able to make such a good impression that his counsel will. 
want him to testify. It is equally easy to conceive of an innocent 
defendant who is so ugly, or stupid, or who has such a poor memory 
of the facts surrounding the events in question that his counsel will 
not want him to testify.2s 
23. See Bradley, Havens, Jenkins, and Salvucci, and the JJefendanl's "Right" lo Test!/)', 18 
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 419, 431 n.121 (1981) (criticizing such impeachment - at least when it 
involves a crime similar to the one at bar - as being inconsistent with the defendant's due 
process right to testify). 
24. A. AMsTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIM· 
INAL CASES§ 390 (1967) (emphasis original). 
25. Consider an innocent defendant who was at home alone and asleep at the time of the 
robbery he is alleged to have committed. Such an uncorroborated alibi would almost certainly 
not be presented if a single other negative feature (prior conviction, poor demeanor, etc.) is 
present Even though the defendant is actually innocent, his testimony will not create that 
appearance and he will be held off the stand. Similarly, consider an innocent defendant who is 
charged with having participated in a conspiracy that took place some seven years before trial, 
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While my conclusion that the inference of guilt from silence is 
irrational may be considered as simply my view of "common sense" 
versus that of Ayer,26 there is doctrinal support for the position that I 
take. Ayer analyzes the historic purposes of the fifth amendment 
and concludes that the Grfllin rule finds no basis in them. 27 The pur-
pose advanced by Ayer that is most pertinent to this discussion is 
"the enhancement of human dignity by sparing guilty defendants the 
unhappy choice between harmful disclosure, contempt, or per-
jury."28 If this is the purpose of the amendment, it follows that it is 
rational to infer that one who asserts it is likely to be guilty. But the 
Supreme Court has identified an additional purpose that the fifth 
amendment serves, beyond those stated by Ayer: 
Recent re-examination of the history and meaning of the Fifth 
Amendment has emphasized anew that one of the basic functions of 
the privilege is to protect innocent men. . . . ''Too many, even those 
of us who should be better advised, view this privilege as a shelter for 
wrongdoers. They too readily assume that those who invoke it are ei-
ther guilty of crime or commit perjury in claiming the privilege."29 
Of course, Ayer is on firm ground when he quotes the pertinent 
language of the fifth amendment that no one "shall be compelled 
and who simply has no recollection of the events charged. Again, such a defendant will almo~t 
surely not testify, despite his innocence. See also H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN 
JURY 146 (1966). Kalven & Zeisel discovered that defendants without a criminal record elect 
to testify 37% more often than defendants with a record of past convictions. 
26. However, Ayer's view that the innocent are more likely to deny guilt than the guilty 
has been debunked by no less a friend of law enforcement than Chief Justice Burger. In 
disagreeing with the assertion of the Court in Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957) 
that "the innocent are more likely to [remain silent] in secret proceedings ... than in open 
court proceedings,'' he averred: 
(T]here is not a scintilla of empirical data to support [this] generalization. . . . It is no 
more accurate than to say, for example, that the innocent rather than the guilty, are the 
first to protest their innocence. There is simply no basis for declaring a generalized 
probability one way or the other. 
United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 181 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
27. Ayer, supra note 6, at 848-52. 
28. Id. at 849 (emphasis in original). The other purposes cited by Ayer are (1) "the deter-
rence of torture and other forms of outright coercion"; (2) "the assurance of fairness in crimi-
nal procedure by cultivating a proper relationship between citizens and their government - or 
more precisely, by requiring the prosecution to develop and prove a criminal case without help 
from the defendant"; and (3) ''the protection of free expression and association." Id. at 848-
49. See note 31 infra for a discussion of how Ayer's proposal would also run afoul of the 
second stated purpose of the amendment. 
29. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391,421 (1957) (quoting Ulman v. United States, 
350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956))(emphasis original). 
In Grunewald the Court held that a defendant who testifies at trial cannot be cross-ex-
amined as to his assertion of the right to silence in the grand jury for the reasons stated in the 
text. The holding in Gr!ftin would, it seems, follow inevitably from the reasoning, if not the 
holding, of Grunewald (Grunewald was a supervisory, not a constitutional, decision). Cf. 
United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975) (defendant who offered alibi on the witness stand 
was improperly questioned about his earlier silence during a police interrogation). But see 
Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980). 
1296 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 79:1290 
. . . to be a witness against himself," and notes that the practice con-
demned in Gr!flin did not "compel" testimony in the strict sense of 
the word, but rather merely imposed a burden on nontestimony.30 
And Ayer is surely correct in observing that, according to recent de-
cisions of the Court, the finding of a burden "is where the analysis 
begins, not where it ends."31 But given that there are a variety of 
reasons, totally consistent with innocence, that may impel one to ex-
ercise his fifth amendment right to silence, it follows that to allow the 
judge or prosecutor to tell the jury that such an exercise is evidence 
of guilt is not "rational" and should not be permitted. The drawing 
of an "irrational" inference from the exercise of a constitutional 
right is clearly an impermissible burden.32 
Even if I were to agree with Ayer as to the rationality of the in-
ference of guilt, I would still contend that the burden imposed by 
that inference upon the exercise of a constitutional right is impermis-
sible. It is true, as Ayer points out, that there are many burdens 
associated with the exercise of constitutional rights. For instance, 
pressure to testify "arises from the evidence in the case and the de-
fendant's fear that the jury will draw the adverse inference on its 
own."33 Obviously, as the Court recognized in Gr!flin, it is one thing 
for the defendant to be faced with a difficult choice because of the 
nature of a criminal trial.34 It is quite another for the government to 
impose a specific penalty (as such comment surely is) upon the exer-
cise of a constitutional right.35 
30. See Carter v. Kentucky, 101 S. Ct. 1112, 1122 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring) ("A de-
fendant who chooses not to testify hardly can claim that he was compelled to testify") ( emphasis 
original). 
31. Ayer, supra note 6, at 855. 
While prosecutorial comment arguably does not "compel" testimony, it may be said to 
compel self-incrimination. The prosecutor's argument is that the defendant's silence should be· 
considered as evidence against him - that is, that the silence is incriminating. Thus, incrimi-
nation is compulsory by being unavoidable. By allowing the prosecutor to use the defendant's 
silence as evidence, Ayer's proposal would also violate his third historic purpose of the fifth 
amendment - "requiring the prosecution to develop and prove a criminal case without help 
from the defendant." Id. at 849. If the no comment rule is abolished the defendant can't 
avoid "helping" the prosecution, for either silence or testimony will be used against him. Ayer 
concedes that "the defendant's decision to remain silent is not a testimonial or communicative 
act," id. at 868, and then proposes to turn it into such an act by letting the prosecutor argue 
that it is evidence of guilt. 
32. See Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 841-43 (1973) and cases cited therein. 
33. Ayer, supra note 6, at 858. 
34. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 133, 211-13 (1971). 
35. County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979), upon which Ayer relies, 
Ayer, supra note 6, at 859-61, can thus be distinguished. The inference of possession of fire-
arms from the fact that the defendants were found in an automobile where such firearms were 
present is, the Court found, "rational," 442 U.S. at 165, unlike the inference of guilt from 
silence. Moreover, the presumption in Ulster County was simply a factual presumption arising 
out of a series of events, not out of the defendant's exercise of a constitutional right. It bur-
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There is one line of cases that seems to lend some support to 
Ayer's view that, though prosecutorial comment may burden the 
right to silence, it is not an impermissible burden. In Corbitt v. New 
Jersey36 the Court upheld a statute that imposed a mandatory life 
term upon conviction by a jury but gave the judge discretion to im-
pose a lesser penalty upon conviction by a plea of "non vult." The 
petitioner argued that such a scheme placed an impermissible bur-
den upon his assertion of a right to a jury trial. The Court held that 
encouraging guilty pleas "by offering substantial benefits in return 
for the plea" was permissible. 
Even assuming that these sixth amendment cases may be analo-
gized to the exercise of a fifth amendment right, they may be readily 
distinguished. In contrast to plea negotiations, in which the defend-
ant may bargain for certain benefits in exchange for waiving the 
right to a jury trial, the defendant in the Grtftin situation is faced 
with a Robson's choice. if, for instance, he will be impeached with 
prior convictions ifhe takes the stand, then to testify will cause him a 
serious detriment. If he chooses not to testify, and the prosecutor 
and the judge instruct the jury that his failure to do so is evidence of 
guilt, then he suffers a different detriment by being, in effect, "in-
criminated" by his silence. He does not, as in Corbitt, exchange a 
right for a benefit - no matter what he does, he suffers a detriment. 
A comparable case, in the jury trial context, would be one in which 
the judge instructs the jury that people who choose jury trials are 
likely to be guilty. This, I trust, Ayer does not advocate.37 
dened only the defendant's exercise of his right to silence in the sense that it strengthened the 
prosecution's case. It was in no sense a "penalty" for exercise of a constitutional right. In 
Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973), which involved the presumption of guilty knowl-
edge from the unexplained possession of stolen property, the Court rejected such a "penalty" 
claim out of hand: . 
Introduction of any evidence, direct or circumstantial, tending to implicate the defendant 
in the alleged crime increases the pressure on him to testify. The mere massing of evi-
dence against a defendant cannot be regarded as a violation of the privilege aglllllSt self-
incrimination. 
412 U.S. at 847. 
By contrast, the comment forbidden by Gr!/fin is not simply a logical evidentiary inference, 
but is a penalty that the defendant would have to pay for exercising his right to silence. Even 
if it were true that defendants who fail to testify are more likely to be guilty, none of the cases 
cited by Ayer support the proposition that the exercise of a constitutional right may permissi-
bly give rise to such an argument. Doyle. v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), is precisely to the 
contrary. Cf. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968) (Court held that it was 
"intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered to assert another''). 
36. 439 U.S. 212 (1978). 
37. Actually this inference may be more "rational" than the inference of guilt from silence. 
It was a well known maxim among defense attorneys in the criminal courts of the District of 
Columbia that you never waived a jury trial unless you believed that your client was innocent. 
In cases where the weight of the evidence was against the defendant there was always the 
possibility that the jury, due to sympathy, confusion, prejudice or some other unexpected rea-
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The abolition of the Griffin rule would indeed be a substantial 
boon to prosecutors. To the extent that one feels that prosecutors 
have been unduly hamstrung by the Supreme Court's view of the 
Constitution, arguments that the rule should be abandoned are ap-
pealing. Indeed, any prosecutor would be cheered by the possibili-
ties for accusatorial histrionics that adoption of Ayer's proposal 
would afford. Unfortunately for prosecutors, the Griffin rule is not 
so thin a reed as Ayer portrays it. Rather, the rule is firmly rooted in 
a basic truism: There are many reasons apart from guilt - particu-
larly fear of impeachment with prior convictions - that may cause a 
defendant, upon advice of counsel, to choose not to testify. To allow 
the prosecutor to argue that failure to testify is evidence of guilt is 
thus irrational and inconsistent with our traditional understanding of 
the fifth amendment privilege.38 Such argument is therefore an im-
permissible burden on the right of silence. 
son, might find him not guilty or at least hang. By contrast, the defendant's decision not to 
testify is, in most cases, totally unrelated to his guilt or innocence. 
38. Beyond the express reasoning of the Court in Griffin, a due process rationale can be 
advanced to support the "no co=ent rule." That is, that what the government gives with one 
hand it cannot take away with the other. In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), the Court held 
that it was "fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process" for the authorities to 
advise a suspect of his right to silence and then use that exercise of silence against him at trial. 
426 U.S. at 618. Accord, Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189 (1943). Certainly advice of 
counsel as to one's rights in the courtroom should be accorded as much deference as such 
advice by the police. 
This unfairness problem could be solved by simply advising the defendant that, while he 
has a right to silence, its exercise may be the subject of adverse co=ent, as is done in Ger-
many. See Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans J)o It, 78 MICH. L. 
REv. 204, 208 (1979). While such a procedure would solve this problem, it would not solve the 
more fundamental problem discussed in this Comment: that such prosecutorial argument is 
not rational. 
